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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This interlocutory appeal was filed by three 
Pennsylvania legislators. Senator Elder Vogel and 
Representatives Christopher Sainato and Aaron Bernstine 
(collectively, Legislators) seek review of District Court orders 
denying them absolute legislative immunity and qualified 
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immunity from claims brought by HIRA Educational Services 
of North America.  
I 
The two orders under review denied Appellants’ 
motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b). So we accept HIRA’s 
well-pleaded allegations as true, and we construe the facts and 
draw all reasonable inferences in HIRA’s favor. See Starnes v. 
Butler Cnty. Ct. of C.P., 50th Jud. Dist., 971 F.3d 416, 422 (3d 
Cir. 2020). 
A 
This dispute involves the sale of property owned by the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Each year, the Pennsylvania 
Department of General Services (DGS) develops a plan to sell 
Commonwealth-owned property. 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 651.3 (West). The Pennsylvania General 
Assembly, comprised of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives, must approve DGS’s plan. § 651.4.  
In 2017, consistent with the plan approved by the 
General Assembly, DGS solicited bids for the purchase of the 
New Castle Youth Development Center, a property which had 
housed juvenile offenders in Shenango Township until it 
closed in 2013. DGS had been trying to sell the property for 
several years but never received an adequate bid. 
This time, Appellee HIRA—a consulting agency for 
Islamic educational groups—submitted the highest bid of 
$400,000. HIRA wanted to use the property to establish a 
youth intervention center much like the one located there 
before. HIRA also hoped to establish an Islamic boarding 
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school on the property. DGS accepted HIRA’s bid, and the 
parties entered into a land sale agreement. 
On June 7, 2017, a week after HIRA and DGS entered 
into the sale agreement, Vogel, Bernstine, and Sainato sent a 
letter to Governor Tom Wolf expressing concerns about the 
sale. The Legislators claimed HIRA was not in a financial 
position to turn the property into an economic driver for the 
community. They noted that New Jersey had revoked HIRA’s 
corporate status and HIRA reported low income on several of 
its tax filings. The Legislators also complained that HIRA had 
not returned their phone calls and that some paperwork relating 
to the sale remained incomplete. The Legislators requested a 
written response and a meeting with Governor Wolf to discuss 
their concerns. 
When Governor Wolf did not act, the Legislators took a 
public stand against the sale. Bernstine, Sainato, and a staffer 
from Vogel’s office attended a Shenango Township 
community meeting where some members of the public made 
disparaging comments about Muslims and espoused baseless 
rumors about HIRA and HIRA’s plans for the property. 
Bernstine and Sainato also complained to the press. They 
thought the sale was being pushed through too quickly, and 
distrusted HIRA’s stated intentions for the property. Bernstine 
vowed to “continue to pursue every avenue possible to uncover 
information related to this facility and [to] continue to call 
[HIRA] daily until they pick up their phone.” App. 45, ¶ 69. 
And when the Lawrence County District Attorney’s Office 
opened a criminal investigation into the sale based on an 
anomaly in the bidding process, Bernstine saw the 
investigation as “another step toward getting the sale vacated.” 
App. 46, ¶ 72. 
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The Legislators then tried to pass a law divesting DGS 
of the authority to sell the property. See S. Res. 154, 2017 Leg., 
2017 Sess. (Pa. 2017). Vogel introduced Resolution 154, and 
after the Senate approved it, Sainato and Bernstine presented it 
to the House State Government Committee. The full House 
abandoned the resolution without a vote. After the resolution 
failed, Bernstine, Sainato, and a staffer from Vogel’s office 
met with the Secretary of DGS to try to persuade DGS to halt 
the sale. 
At the local level, Shenango Township adopted 
Ordinance No. 4 of 2017, which rezoned the area where the 
Development Center was located to prohibit commercial 
schools. HIRA alleged the Township adopted the ordinance to 
frustrate HIRA’s goal of establishing a boarding school on the 
property. But HIRA did not allege any connection between the 
Legislators and the ordinance. 
HIRA claimed the public outcry, Shenango Township’s 
new zoning ordinance, Senator Vogel’s resolution, and the 
criminal investigation prevented HIRA from securing funding 
and prevented the Commonwealth from transferring clear title, 
which caused the parties to void the land sale agreement. 
After the sale fell through, DGS asked for new bids. 
HIRA offered $500,000 but was outbid by a group that offered 
$2,000,000. Bernstine and Sainato promised to ensure the new 
purchaser secured funding, and none of the Legislators 
challenged the sale to this new buyer. 
B 
HIRA sued various state and local officials, including 
the Legislators in their individual capacities. At issue on appeal 
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are the Legislators’ alleged violations of the Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the 
Pennsylvania Religious Freedom Protection Act, and 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. HIRA also requested declaratory and injunctive 
relief to delay the transfer of the property to the new buyer.  
The Legislators moved to dismiss. All three claimed 
absolute legislative immunity under federal common law and 
the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Speech or Debate Clause. 
Vogel and Sainato also claimed qualified immunity, but 
Bernstine did not. 
The District Court denied the Legislators’ motions to 
dismiss. Although at first it found the immunity claims to be 
“straightforward legal arguments,” the Court rejected the 
motions as “premature” because “[w]hether any of these 
individuals is entitled to immunity rests upon whether the 
individuals engaged in ‘legitimate’ activities while in the 
course and scope of their position and authority.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. 
88, at 2. It found, based on the allegations of HIRA’s 
complaint, that none of the Legislators were engaged in 
legitimate legislative activities, so the “legal issues concerning 
immunity . . . [were] mired in facts, which need to be 
developed through the discovery process.” Id. The District 
Court denied Sainato’s motion to dismiss in its order dated 
June 13. It denied Bernstine and Vogel’s motions to dismiss on 
June 21 after resolving their unrelated arguments.  
The Legislators filed Notices of Appeal from the 
District Court’s orders.1 But the District Court challenged the 
 
1 Bernstine filed his Notice of Appeal prematurely. Under Rule 
4(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the 
Cape May Greene doctrine, his Notice became effective when 
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appeal for two reasons. First, the Court did not believe it made 
a final decision on the Legislators’ immunity because it 
“simply dismissed [the] Motion[s] to Dismiss as ‘premature’” 
to allow the parties “to develop a factual record.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. 
102, at 2. Second, because it denied the motions without 
prejudice, the District Court did not think the collateral order 
doctrine applied.2 
II 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
HIRA’s federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. It had 
supplemental jurisdiction over the Pennsylvania Religious 
Freedom Protection Act claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
Our jurisdiction is disputed. HIRA claims we lack 
jurisdiction over this appeal because the District Court’s orders 
were not final. We disagree. 
Ordinarily, a final order “is one that ends the litigation 
on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute 
the judgment.” Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund 
of Int’l. Union of Operating Eng’rs & Participating Emps., 571 
 
the District Court entered judgment. See FED. R. APP. P. 
4(a)(2); Adapt of Phila. v. Phila. Housing Authority, 433 F.3d 
353, 362–64 (3d Cir. 2006). 
2 The District Court treated Sainato’s Notice of Appeal as a 
motion to stay, denied that motion, and ordered the Legislators 
to continue to comply with the deadlines set in the District 
Court’s scheduling order. The District Court later granted a 




U.S. 177, 183 (2014). But under the collateral order doctrine, 
certain interlocutory orders are final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291, including some orders denying immunity. See, e.g., 
George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 570–71 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(qualified immunity); Youngblood v. DeWeese, 352 F.3d 836, 
838 (3d Cir. 2003) (legislative immunity). Where absolute or 
qualified immunity apply, parties are immune from suit, not 
merely from liability. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525, 
527–28 (1985). For that reason, the Supreme Court has 
“repeatedly . . . stressed the importance of resolving immunity 
questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.” Hunter v. 
Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per curiam). 
Denials of immunity are immediately appealable even 
if the denial is “implicit.” When a district court refuses to rule 
on an immunity claim “on the premise that the court is unable, 
. . . or prefers not to, determine the motion without discovery” 
then it is making “at least an implicit decision that the 
complaint alleges a . . . claim on which relief can be granted.” 
Rehiel, 738 F.3d at 571 (quoting X-Men Sec., Inc. v. Pataki, 
196 F.3d 56, 66 (2d Cir. 1999)). Such delay vitiates immunity 
as government officials “otherwise entitled to immunity [are] 
nonetheless subjected to ‘the burdens of such pretrial matters 
as discovery.’” Oliver v. Roquet, 858 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 
2017) (quoting Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996)).  
Here, the District Court made two errors when it 
deemed the Legislators’ appeals improper. First, its order acted 
as an implicit denial of immunity—even though it was without 
prejudice—because it would require the Legislators to bear the 
burdens of discovery and other pretrial matters. See id. Second, 
the Legislators’ immunity claims depend on questions of law 
and not on factual disputes that would deprive us of 
jurisdiction. See id. at 187. The Legislators do not, for purposes 
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of this appeal, challenge the truth of HIRA’s allegations. They 
argue instead that even if HIRA’s allegations are true they are 
nonetheless entitled to absolute or qualified immunity. 
Besides, any factual challenge by the Legislators would be 
doomed because this appeal arises from the District Court’s 
denial of their motions to dismiss. As previously noted, at this 
stage of the litigation we accept HIRA’s well-pleaded 
allegations as true. See Starnes, 971 F.3d at 422. Whether 
HIRA alleged conduct by the Legislators that falls outside the 
sphere of legitimate legislative activities or that violates clearly 
established law is a question of law over which we have 
jurisdiction. See Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & 
Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 2016); Carver v. 
Foerster, 102 F.3d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1996).  
III 
Having established our jurisdiction, we turn to the 
merits. The question presented is whether the Legislators are 
entitled to either absolute legislative immunity or qualified 
immunity. 
A 
We first consider absolute immunity. Although 
legislative immunity from federal claims and state claims arise 
from different sources, in this case the scope of immunity is the 
same for both. State legislators’ immunity from federal claims 
comes from federal common law, which “in civil cases . . . is 
coterminous with that of the immunity provided by the Speech 
or Debate Clause.” Larsen v. Senate of Pa., 152 F.3d 240, 249 
(3d Cir. 1998) (discussing immunity and liability under 
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§ 1983); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.3 Legislative 
immunity from state law claims is governed by the 
Pennsylvania Constitution’s Speech or Debate Clause, PA. 
CONST. art. II, § 15,4 but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
looks to caselaw interpreting the federal Speech or Debate 
Clause to guide its interpretation of the Pennsylvania clause. 
See Consumers Educ. & Protective Ass’n v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 
675, 680–81 (Pa. 1977). Thus, our analysis is governed by 
caselaw applying the federal Speech or Debate Clause when 
determining the Legislators’ immunity to HIRA’s claims. 
Although the text of the Speech or Debate Clauses 
protects only speech made during a legislative session, the 
Supreme Court has extended the immunity far beyond that 
context. In civil cases, a legislator is immune for “all actions 
taken ‘in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity.’” Bogan 
v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54 (1998) (quoting Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)). This sphere includes 
 
3 “The Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all cases, 
except treason, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged 
from arrest during their attendance at the session of their 
respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the 
same; and for any speech or debate in either House, they shall 
not be questioned in any other place.” 
4 “The members of the General Assembly shall in all cases, 
except treason, felony, violation of their oath of office, and 
breach or surety of the peace, be privileged from arrest during 
their attendance at the sessions of their respective Houses and 
in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or 




acts that are “quintessentially legislative” or that are “integral 
steps in the legislative process.” Id. at 55. We have recognized 
several activities within this sphere: legislative factfinding and 
investigation, writing committee reports, offering resolutions, 
voting, and “the things generally done in a session of the House 
by one of its members in relation to the business before it.” 
Youngblood, 352 F.3d at 839 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 
(1880)).  
Immunity does not attach, however, to acts only 
“casually or incidentally related to legislative affairs but not a 
part of the legislative process itself.” Id. at 840 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Brewster, 
408 U.S. 501, 528 (1972)). Such acts include political activities 
like performing “errands” for constituents, making 
appointments with government agencies, securing government 
contracts, preparing news releases, and delivering speeches 
outside Congress. Id. 
Although HIRA makes slightly different claims against 
each of the Legislators, it seeks to hold them liable for the 
following actions: (1) introducing a resolution to divest DGS 
of its authority to sell the property; (2) co-authoring a letter to 
Governor Wolf describing their concerns with the sale; (3) 
acting with discriminatory intent; (4) making public statements 
against the sale that implied unscrupulous behavior by HIRA 
or DGS; (5) calling HIRA repeatedly; (6) meeting with the 
Secretary of DGS to try to persuade him to halt the sale; and 
(7) treating the subsequent purchaser of the property more 
favorably than they treated HIRA. We address each below.  
At the outset, our analysis is unaffected by HIRA’s 
allegation that the Legislators acted with discriminatory intent. 
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Both legislative and qualified immunity protect legislators 
irrespective of their subjective intent. See Youngblood, 352 
F.3d at 840–41 (legislative immunity); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1982) (qualified immunity). 
Vogel’s introduction of Senate Resolution 154 and 
Sainato and Bernstine’s presentation of it to the House were 
quintessentially legislative activities. See Youngblood, 352 
F.3d at 839. HIRA tries to distinguish this resolution by citing 
Ryan v. Burlington Cnty., N.J., which created two criteria for 
an action to be legislative; the action must be both 
substantively legislative (i.e., involve general policy decisions 
rather than target individuals) and procedurally legislative (i.e., 
passed by proper legislative procedures). See 889 F.2d 1286, 
1290–91 (3d Cir. 1989). HIRA argues that because the 
resolution targeted HIRA, it was too narrowly focused to be 
substantively legislative. HIRA misreads our precedent. We 
ask whether an official act is substantively and procedurally 
legislative when classifying actions performed by municipal 
officials who possess both legislative and administrative 
powers. Larsen, 152 F.3d at 252. When determining whether 
state legislators are acting legislatively, however, we consider 
only the nature of the act rather than its target or effect. See id.; 
Bogan, 523 U.S. at 54. Accordingly, we hold the Legislators 
are entitled to absolute legislative immunity for introducing 
Resolution 154. 
Absolute legislative immunity also applies to the 
Legislators’ letter to Governor Wolf and Bernstine’s calls to 
HIRA because both are examples of protected legislative 
factfinding. See Youngblood, 352 F.3d at 839. Legislative 
factfinding is an “essential” part of the legislative process. 
Gov’t of V.I. v. Lee, 775 F.2d 514, 521 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying 
federal Speech or Debate Clause principles when interpreting 
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Virgin Islands immunity statute). Here, because the Legislators 
had the authority to introduce legislation to block the sale, they 
also had the authority to engage in factfinding to help draft 
such legislation. The letter to the Governor outlined the 
Legislators’ concerns but then requested a meeting so they 
could learn more about the sale before introducing Resolution 
154. Likewise, the calls to HIRA were attempts to learn more 
about the sale while the resolution was pending in the 
legislature.  
In addition to the quintessentially legislative activities 
just discussed, HIRA claimed the Legislators made 
disparaging public comments about HIRA, met with the DGS 
Secretary in an attempt to get DGS to cancel the sale to HIRA, 
and gave preferential treatment to the subsequent purchaser of 
the property. These are most accurately described as political 
“errands” or “speeches delivered outside [of] Congress,” so the 
Legislators are not entitled to absolute immunity for those 
activities under Brewster. See 408 U.S. at 512.5 But are the 
 
5 The Commonwealth Court’s decision in Firetree, Ltd. v. 
Fairchild ruled under Pennsylvania law that public speeches 
and comments by a legislator opposed to the sale of 
Commonwealth property “fell within the ambit of legitimate 
legislative activity” because the General Assembly could act 
on the issue. 920 A.2d 913, 922 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007). While 
Firetree may serve as a basis to dismiss the state law claims 
related to public comments on absolute immunity grounds, 
Firetree cannot resolve the federal law claims against the 
Legislators. Accordingly, we must address whether or not the 




Legislators entitled to qualified immunity for that conduct? We 
address that question next. 
B 
Qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability 
“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. When analyzing 
a qualified immunity claim we consider “(1) whether the 
plaintiff sufficiently alleged the violation of a constitutional 
right, and (2) whether the right was ‘clearly established’ at the 
time of the official’s conduct.” L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 
F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2016).  
To be clearly established, a right must be so apparent 
that “every reasonable official would understand that what he 
is doing is unlawful.” James v. N.J. State Police, 957 F.3d 165, 
169 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. ---, 138 S. Ct. 577, 
589 (2018)). An official will not be charged with such an 
understanding unless existing precedent has “placed the 
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. 
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). And as the Supreme Court 
emphasized recently, the right must be defined with a “high 
‘degree of specificity’” before we consider that right clearly 
established. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (quoting Mullenix v. 
Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 13 (2015)). The legal principle established 
in a precedential case must “clearly prohibit the offic[ial’s] 
conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” Id. at 581. 
HIRA’s claims against Vogel and Sainato fail because 
HIRA has not pointed to any precedential case prohibiting 
legislators from speaking against the sale of state-owned 
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property or from extending preferential treatment to certain 
recipients of government contracts. HIRA counters that the 
general constitutional rule that government officials cannot 
interfere with the free exercise of religion was sufficiently clear 
to give the Legislators fair warning of liability. But given the 
high degree of specificity required to prove that a right has 
been clearly established, the general constitutional rule HIRA 
points to does not suffice.  
HIRA’s case is weaker still in view of X-Men Security, 
Inc. v. Pataki, the only case on point. See 196 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 
1999).6 In X-Men, the plaintiff security company held a public 
contract. Two legislator-defendants: (1) urged a state agency to 
terminate the contract, id. at 61; (2) asked a federal agency and 
congressional committee to investigate the company, id. at 62; 
and (3) accused the security company of being racist, anti-
Semitic, a religious hate group, misogynistic, and affiliated 
with the Nation of Islam, see id. at 71. The Second Circuit held 
that the plaintiffs failed to allege a violation of any 
constitutional or statutory right—let alone a clearly established 
one—because “the First Amendment protects a legislator’s 
right to communicate with administrative officials to provide 
assistance in securing a publicly funded contract, [and it also] 
protect[s] the legislator’s right to state publicly his criticism of 
the granting of such a contract to a given entity and to urge to 
the administrators that such an award would contravene public 
policy.” Id. at 70.  
 
6 While not discussing qualified immunity and therefore not 
directly on point, Firetree concluded in dicta that under the 
First Amendment, legislators have “an absolute right, as a 
citizen or as a legislator, to petition the executive branch to stop 
a proposed sale of Commonwealth property.” 920 A.2d at 919. 
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Like the plaintiffs in X-Men, HIRA alleges the 
Legislators urged the agency (DGS) to terminate its contract 
with HIRA, sought an investigation into the sale, disparaged 
HIRA, and favored a different recipient of the government 
contract. HIRA’s only attempt to distinguish this case from X-
Men is to assert that it “has clearly articulated both the 
constitutional and statutory rights that have been violated by 
the Legislative Defendants and the actions that constituted 
those violations.” HIRA Response Br. 34–35. Even assuming 
that HIRA has alleged violations of constitutional and statutory 
rights that are not foreclosed by the Legislators’ First 
Amendment rights, that would show only that HIRA has stated 
a claim; it does nothing to show the Legislators violated clearly 
established law. Although HIRA rightly notes that the Second 
Circuit’s decision is not binding on this Court, the absence of 
precedent in its favor from the Supreme Court or this Court 
dooms its case.7 That, combined with an adverse precedent 
from our sister court, puts HIRA well short of showing that the 
rights it seeks to vindicate here were clearly established. So 
Vogel and Sainato are entitled to qualified immunity.8  
 
7 The recent Supreme Court decision in Taylor v. Riojas, 141 
S. Ct. 52 (2020), does not change our analysis in this case. The 
Legislators’ actions were not so outrageous that “no reasonable 
. . . officer could have concluded” they were permissible under 
the Constitution, Taylor, 141 S. Ct. at 53, especially in light of 
X-Men and Firetree. 
8 Because Bernstine failed to raise qualified immunity before 
the District Court in his Rule 12(b)(6) motion, he has forfeited 
that defense in this appeal. See Spireas v. Comm’r, 886 F.3d 
315, 321 (3d Cir. 2018). He may re-raise it on remand. See 
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* * * 
 For the reasons stated, we will reverse in part and affirm 
in part. We will reverse the District Court’s order denying 
Vogel and Sainato’s motions to dismiss based on absolute and 
qualified immunity. Bernstine is entitled to absolute immunity 
for some of the allegations made against him, so we will 
reverse the District Court’s order except as to those actions for 
which he is not entitled to absolute immunity. We leave those 
issues to the District Court on remand. 
 
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 309 (1996) (allowing 
qualified immunity to be raised for a second time on remand). 
